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LESSONS FROM PEOPLE WITH 
NONPROGRESSIVE HIV INFECTION
 
I
 
NFECTIOUS
 
 diseases can be extremely variable in
their manifestations, but human immunodeficiency vi-
rus (HIV) infection is notorious for its protean mani-
festations. One of these, the absence of any apparent
progression of disease over a decade or more, is partic-
ularly intriguing. The average time from HIV infection
to death is 10 years, but clinical and immunologic de-
cline is generally evident much earlier. About 5 percent
of infected people are characterized as having nonpro-
gressive infection because they remain healthy and do
not have the declining CD4
 

 
 lymphocyte counts that
are evident in people with progressive disease.
 
1
 
 Al-
though we remain uncertain of their eventual fate, peo-
ple with long-term nonprogressive infection nonethe-
less have especially favorable outcomes of an otherwise
fatal disease. From these patients we may be able to
learn important lessons that could improve the treat-
ment of those with progressive disease. In this issue of
the 
 
Journal
 
 there are three reports
 
2-4
 
 of investigations
into the possibility that people with long-term nonpro-
gressive infection represent some special circumstance
of the virus–host interaction.
Earlier descriptions of HIV infection suggested that
it has three distinct phases: an early (acute) phase with
marked viremia, a second (latent) phase with very low
viral replication, and a final phase of frank AIDS, again
with substantial viremia. Recent work has modified
that perspective, because it has become evident that
the latent period, although characterized by few clini-
cal symptoms, involves extensive viral replication. It
has even been suggested that after the end of the acute
phase the rate of viral production changes little.
 
5
 
 Virus-
infected cells in the body appear to die within a few
days after they begin producing virus. Therefore, to
maintain the pool of infected cells in the body, there
must be continual new infection of CD4
 

 
 cells.
 
6,7
 
 
Why one phase of HIV infection differs from another
remains poorly understood. There appears to be initial
activation of a very effective immune response. This is
followed much later by a waning of the host response,
reflecting the erosion of the infected immune system.
The infected person’s health declines when the immune
system can no longer cope with the constant barrage of
virus. Then the virus gets the upper hand. This could
involve exhausting the replicative potential of CD4
 

 
cells. As CD4
 

 
 cells are killed by infection, they are
probably replaced mainly by multiplication of uninfect-
ed CD4
 

 
 cells rather than by differentiation in the thy-
mus, and it is possible that the clones of mature cells
have a limited capacity to renew themselves. This im-
plies a proportionality between the rate of virus pro-
duction and the length of time before the number of
CD4
 

 
 cells begins to decline.
People with nonprogressive infection are probably a
heterogeneous group, with some likely to have nonpro-
gressive infection for a long time, perhaps for their life-
time, and others whose immune systems will decline
more rapidly. The latter could represent the tail of
the distribution of normal responses to HIV infection,
whereas the former could represent a host–virus rela-
tion that differs from that of the vast majority of others
infected by the virus. Even these people with “true”
nonprogressive infection are likely to be heterogeneous,
with some harboring a genetically unique virus and
others enjoying an unusually effective immune re-
sponse to an ordinary strain of HIV. Either way, under-
standing the cause of the nonprogression would be illu-
minating.
The picture we get from the two recent studies of
people with nonprogressive infection is quite consis-
tent.
 
2,3
 
 Most of those studied had been infected for
more than 10 years, and some for 15 years. They all
had robust immune responses to their infections, and
Pantaleo et al. showed that their lymph nodes retained
an architecture indicative of a healthy response to in-
fection.
 
2
 
 By contrast, during the later stages of their in-
fections, those with progressive disease have eroded
lymph nodes and generally poor immune responses.
Likely though it seems, we cannot conclude that the
immune reactions of the people with nonprogressive in-
fections are the cause of their special status, because
those healthy immune responses could merely reflect
the lack of progression. After the acute early phase of
infection has subsided, most infected people have
strong immune responses, and those with nonprogres-
sive infections may have simply retained that status. If
there is anything special about their immune response
to explain the nonprogression of their disease, it re-
mains to be found. Their strong immune responses to
HIV do, however, indicate that they are continually ex-
posed to viral antigens, a finding that attests to the con-
tinued replication of the virus over the many years
since the acute infection. 
Attempts to isolate infectious virus from the plasma
of the people with nonprogressive infection were uni-
formly negative, but in some cases virus was cultured
from peripheral-blood cells, and in one study
 
2
 
 it was
consistently recovered from lymph-node cells. Cao et
al.
 
3
 
 studied the recovered virus in detail and found that
some strains grew particularly poorly. Other strains
replicated well, however, and the viruses from asymp-
tomatic people generally replicate less well than those
from patients with late-stage disease, making it impos-
sible to conclude that the absence of disease progres-
sion is a consequence of a defect in the virus.
Using the polymerase chain reaction to measure vi-
ral nucleic acids, both studies found that as compared
with people with progressive disease, those with non-
progressive infections had low levels of circulating viral
particles as well as low levels of viral DNA and RNA in
their peripheral-blood mononuclear cells. Cao et al.
 
3
 
found much lower levels than Pantaleo et al.,
 
2
 
 presum-
ably a reflection of the different populations studied.
The third report in this issue,
 
4
 
 by Kirchhoff et al.,
documents a study of viral sequences isolated from one
person with long-term nonprogressive infection. Seg-
ments of integrated HIV DNA isolated from samples
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banked over an 11-year period all showed a clear de-
fect, a deletion of portions of the critical 
 
nef
 
 gene of
HIV. Monkeys infected with simian immunodeficiency
virus (SIV) harboring 
 
nef
 
 deletions also have nonpro-
gressive infection, suggesting that in this one case, the
cause of the nonprogression may have been found.
Advance reports of this observation have been cir-
culating for some time, and many investigators have
sought evidence of 
 
nef
 
 deletions in the virus from oth-
ers with nonprogressive infection, but to no avail so far.
Thus, the finding in this patient appears to be very
rare. It raises the possibility, however, that other lesions
will be found in other viral strains from patients with
nonprogressive infections and that a low level of rep-
lication due to debilitating mutations may sometimes
be responsible for HIV infection without disease pro-
gression.
An interesting corollary of nonprogressive infection
is that if viral mutations are responsible in some cases,
those hosts must be immune to a second infection. For
instance, the person harboring the strain with 
 
nef
 
 dele-
tions has hemophilia and probably had multiple expo-
sures to HIV. Others are homosexual men who proba-
bly had multiple opportunities to be infected. In fact, it
is well documented that people infected with HIV vir-
tually never show signs of having more than one circu-
lating strain of virus. Although the sequences of viral
RNA molecules isolated from a given infected subject
vary continually, they are closely related, and the vari-
ation appears to arise from mutation rather than from
infection by a second virus. 
It is an irony of this awful disease that an infected
person’s immune reaction can be effective enough to
prevent secondary infections, but not effective enough
to eliminate the primary infection. Thus, the virus with
 
nef
 
 deletions may act as a type of attenuated-virus vac-
cine. SIV with 
 
nef
 
 deletions has been shown to act as a
vaccine in monkeys.
 
8
 
 There has been discussion of the
possibility of producing a human attenuated-virus vac-
cine in this way, but recent evidence that neonatal mon-
keys get AIDS from a virus with deletions of this type
has dampened the enthusiasm.
 
9
 
 The evident safety of
vaccines made entirely of viral proteins makes such
vaccines more attractive, but they have not yet proved
effective. Therefore, continued study of an attenuated-
virus vaccine is reasonable.
 
R
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POST-REMISSION TREATMENT OF ACUTE 
MYELOGENOUS LEUKEMIA
 
A
 
CUTE
 
 myelogenous leukemia (AML) is character-
ized by both an increase in the number of white cells
and arrest of their normal maturation and function,
which causes anemia, granulocytopenia, and thrombo-
cytopenia. The goal of treatment is to eliminate all neo-
plastic hematopoietic cells in the marrow, peripheral
blood, and elsewhere. This goal can be accomplished in
some but not all adult patients with AML through the
use of two distinct, consecutive phases of treatment.
The combination chemotherapy administered during
the first phase in a patient with newly diagnosed AML
is intended to induce a complete remission, a condition
in which leukemic cells can no longer be identified by
cytologic, immunologic, or cytogenetic methods and the
patient’s peripheral-blood counts have become normal.
The second phase of treatment (post-remission treat-
ment) is designed to eradicate any residual leukemic
cells anywhere. Thus, post-remission treatment should
prevent relapse and improve survival. The develop-
ment of better post-remission therapies in recent years
has received much attention.
During the 1970s and early 1980s all patients re-
ceived post-remission treatment in the form of mainte-
nance chemotherapy for one to three years after they
had entered remission. These chemotherapy regimens
gradually increased in intensity, so that the average
rates of survival and disease-free survival were approx-
imately 20 percent at four years, although late relaps-
es occurred. During the past 10 years, considerably
more aggressive post-remission regimens have been in-
troduced in the hope of improving this rather dismal
outcome. These new regimens include allogeneic bone
marrow transplantation, autologous bone marrow trans-
plantation, and dose-intensified chemotherapy.
Allogeneic bone marrow transplantation in which
marrow from HLA-matched relatives is used in pa-
tients in a first complete remission results in disease-
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free survival in approximately 50 percent of patients.
 
1
 
The patient first receives high-dose cytotoxic therapy to
eliminate marrow function entirely, followed by trans-
plantation of bone marrow from an HLA-matched rel-
ative. This regimen is currently the most effective anti-
leukemic therapy available, because of the low risk of
relapse (about 20 percent), but its toxicity is compar-
atively high. Wide application of allogeneic bone mar-
row transplantation in patients with AML in a first
complete remission has not been possible because pa-
tients who are 50 years of age or older generally bene-
fit little and therefore are not considered eligible for
the procedure. In addition, HLA-matched related do-
nors are unavailable for many patients. Thus, alloge-
neic bone marrow transplantation has remained a
treatment of exclusivity, available mostly to young pa-
tients and those for whom a suitable donor can be
found.
The encouraging results of allogeneic transplanta-
tion have stimulated investigators to exploit the same
high-dose cytotoxic treatment, except that the patient
receives autologous marrow instead of donor marrow.
The autologous bone marrow is collected while the pa-
tient is in remission, and temporarily stored in liquid
nitrogen. Accumulating experience indicates that autol-
ogous bone marrow transplantation in adults with AML
in a first complete remission results in a disease-free
survival of approximately 40 to 50 percent at four
years.
 
2,3
 
 Obviously, the stumbling block of finding a
suitable donor is avoided in autologous transplantation.
It is less toxic than allogeneic transplantation and is
currently used in patients up to 60 years of age. Thus,
autologous transplantation has become available to
many patients who are not eligible for allogeneic trans-
plantation and has yielded results not much different
from those of allogeneic transplantation. However, the
distribution of causes of death after autologous trans-
plantation does differ from that after allogeneic trans-
plantation. Among patients who receive autologous
bone marrow, the most important causes of death are
relapse of AML and complications of the transplanta-
tion procedures.
A third type of post-remission treatment that has
emerged is the use of dose-intensified chemotherapy
outside the context of bone marrow rescue. In a recent
prospective, comparative study of a dose-escalation
regimen, high doses of cytarabine resulted in a signifi-
cantly better outcome than low doses in adults younger
than 60 years of age who had AML
 
4
 
; the disease-free
survival at four years was 44 percent for the high-dose
schedule.
The study by Zittoun et al.
 
5
 
 reported in this issue of
the 
 
Journal
 
 provides an important prospective analysis
of the value of autologous bone marrow transplantation
as post-remission therapy. It is the first direct compar-
ison of autologous transplantation and chemotherapy in
a large series of patients. When the results were ana-
lyzed according to the intention-to-treat method, the
outcome for patients assigned to autologous transplan-
tation was better than for those assigned to chemother-
apy (four-year disease-free survival, 48 percent vs. 30
percent). Does the study provide a definite answer to
the question of the comparative value of autologous
bone marrow transplantation and modern intensive
chemotherapy? It probably does not. The study patients
were considerably younger than most adults with AML.
Most centers participating in the study enrolled only
patients less than 45 years of age, so that the mean age
of the study patients was less than 35 years. More
important, the post-remission chemotherapy regimen,
when considered in retrospect, may have been less than
optimal. One cycle of chemotherapy was compared
with autologous transplantation; under these conditions
autologous transplantation appeared superior. In an-
other study of sequential cycles of intensive chemother-
apy in somewhat older patients,
 
4
 
 the results (disease-
free survival, 44 percent) were not at all inferior to
those reported by Zittoun et al. after autologous trans-
plantation. In addition, in a recent prospective, con-
trolled study of autologous transplantation and high-
dose chemotherapy, the results of the two treatments
were similar.
 
6
 
Autologous bone marrow transplantation after mar-
row-ablative cytotoxic treatment allows dose-intensified
and time-concentrated antileukemic treatment. Howev-
er, for patients with AML it represents an example of a
halfway technology that is still associated with many
constraints. Among patients who have complete re-
sponses after induction chemotherapy and are thus the
prospective candidates for autologous bone marrow
transplantation, only a minority ultimately undergo
transplantation. There are many reasons why in clini-
cal practice eligible patients do not undergo autologous
transplantation. They include intercurrent relapse of
AML, collection of marrow of insufficient quality, and
the presence of coexisting high-risk conditions. In the
study by Zittoun et al.,
 
5
 
 among 393 patients in remis-
sion and without an HLA-matched sibling, only 95 un-
derwent autologous bone marrow transplantation and
104 received intensive chemotherapy. Thus, less than
50 percent of the patients in complete remission under-
went autologous transplantation and completed their
treatment according to the protocol despite their com-
parative youth. The dropout rate was also high in other
studies, confirming that frequent withdrawal is an im-
portant problem.
 
3,6
 
 
A second serious drawback of autologous bone mar-
row transplantation is that hematopoietic regeneration
is notoriously slow in patients with AML.
 
2,3
 
 As a direct
consequence of the prolonged marrow hypoplasia after
autologous transplantation, the patients remain at high
risk of infection and bleeding for a long time, remain
dependent on transfusion support, and must be hospi-
talized for prolonged periods. In the study by Zittoun
et al.,
 
5
 
 for instance, the median length of time for the
platelet count to recover fully was more than 20 weeks.
 
5
 
For autologous transplantation to be established as a
generally useful therapy, it must be simplified. It is
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conceivable that the use of hematopoietic growth fac-
tors or peripheral-blood cells as transplants may make
autologous stem-cell transplantation a more practical
procedure.
Should a patient with AML who is 60 years old or
younger receive a bone marrow transplant or intensive
chemotherapy? In general, in such patients intensive
chemotherapy results in rates of disease-free and over-
all survival that are similar to those with bone marrow
transplantation. Thus, the choice of treatment remains
an open question. Are there variables that might sug-
gest that a patient is more or less suitable for one of
these options? The presence of cytogenetic abnormali-
ties has a strong impact on outcome in patients with
AML and may identify those with a good or a poor
prognosis. There is accumulating evidence to suggest
that patients with unfavorable cytogenetic features
benefit little from aggressive chemotherapy or trans-
plantation and still have a poor outcome.
 
7,8
 
 The use of
prognostic factors in therapeutic decision making for
patients with AML is still in its infancy.
Will allogeneic transplantation, autologous trans-
plantation, and intensive chemotherapy continue to be
used in parallel? Will one of these become the first
choice in distinct subgroups of patients? When should
treatment be carried out? Future studies will need to
answer all these questions.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
 
F
 
INANCIAL
 
 conflicts of interest in a research setting
can adversely affect patient care, teaching, and re-
search. Discussions of these conflicts ordinarily focus
on issues that arise when individual physicians and bio-
medical scientists conduct research in which they have
a financial interest.
 
1-18
 
 Less attention has been paid to
the conflicts of interest that arise when health care in-
stitutions have a financial stake in the research con-
ducted in their laboratories and clinics.
 
19,20
 
 This relative
inattention persists despite the increased pressure on
health care institutions to seek new sources of revenue
to fund their activities and the government’s encour-
agement of the commercialization of federally financed
discoveries.
 
20-23
 
In this article we analyze the ethical issues related to
institutional conflicts of interest, focusing our analysis
by presenting a case that arose at a Harvard-affiliated
hospital. All the details provided are the actual facts of
the case, although the names of the hospital, biotech-
nology company, drug, and diseases involved in the
case are omitted. Our inquiry is limited to situations in-
volving clinical research and a financial interest in the
form of a licensing agreement, but the analysis can be
extended to include institutional conflicts of interest
that involve basic scientific research and situations in
which an institution has equity in a company that is de-
veloping a compound, process, or therapy.
 
19
 
A C
 
ASE
 
 
 
OF
 
 I
 
NSTITUTIONAL
 
 C
 
ONFLICT
 
 
 
OF
 
 I
 
NTEREST
 
In collaboration with scientists at a biotechnology
company, two employees in a division of a Harvard-
affiliated hospital developed a new drug. The employ-
ees subsequently left the hospital. The hospital granted
the biotechnology company exclusive worldwide rights
to the hospital’s portion of the drug patent in return for
royalties on sales and other payments. If the drug is
found to be clinically beneficial, annual sales could to-
tal millions of dollars, and the hospital could receive
substantial royalties. According to an agreement be-
tween the hospital and the employees who developed
the drug, each employee receives 12.5 percent of the
hospital’s proceeds, 50 percent is allocated to the hos-
pital’s general-research fund, 12.5 percent goes to the
department in which the drug was developed, and 12.5
percent goes to the division.
Investigators at the hospital propose two phase 1–2
clinical trials of the drug. In one trial, the drug would
be given to patients with an exceedingly rare, univer-
sally fatal disease in which certain normal biologic
products are lacking. The hospital is a national referral
center for the treatment of patients with this rare dis-
ease and for research on it. The second trial would be
a multicenter study in which the drug would be used to
treat patients with a more common medical disorder.
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The hospital would probably enroll 20 of the 150 pa-
tients in the study.
Neither the proposed principal investigator for both
trials nor any of her nearest relatives have any financial
interest in the biotechnology company or derive a per-
sonal financial benefit from the drug patent. The prin-
cipal investigator’s department and division at the hos-
pital receive proceeds from the drug’s royalties. Also, a
senior physician at the hospital is a member of the bio-
technology company’s scientific board and a consultant
to the company. Payments for his services to the com-
pany go directly to his department, not to him person-
ally.*
 
D
 
ISTINGUISHING
 
 
 
BETWEEN
 
 I
 
NDIVIDUAL
 
 
 
AND
 
 
I
 
NSTITUTIONAL
 
 C
 
ONFLICTS
 
 
 
OF
 
 I
 
NTEREST
 
An institutional conflict of interest arises principally
when an institution has equity in a company and inves-
tigators employed by the institution conduct research
that could affect the value of the equity interest, or
when an institution holds a patent on a compound,
process, or therapy that it licenses to companies and in-
vestigators employed by the institution conduct re-
search on that compound, process, or therapy. Insti-
tutional and individual conflicts of interest differ in
three ways. First, when an investigator at an institu-
tion has a financial stake in a company and is con-
ducting research sponsored by that company, the in-
stitution receives the company’s payment for the
research and monitors the work, but the size of the
payment is not linked to the success of the research.
Thus, neither the short-term nor the long-term finan-
cial interests of the institution are linked to the out-
come of the research.
Second, when the institution has a direct financial in-
terest, the institutional conflict of interest is mediated
through individual investigators employed by the insti-
tution. A physician, nurse, or biomedical researcher ac-
tually performs the patient care or research activities.
Yet because of pressure or their institutional roles, such
investigators may be unwilling to object to the institu-
tion’s practices. 
Finally, when individual investigators pursue their
own financial gain, there is no doubt that this consti-
tutes self-interested behavior, and their personal mo-
tives may undermine their patient care, teaching, or re-
search activities. Conversely, society recognizes that
health care institutions need to obtain funds to carry
*Officials of the Harvard-affiliated hospital involved in this case requested that
we examine the underlying ethical issues, although there was no requirement or
request to do so by any official body of the hospital or Harvard University. Neither
of us and none of the members of our immediate families are or have ever been
employed by or served as consultants to the hospital or the biotechnology com-
pany, although Ropes & Gray, a law firm with which one of us is affiliated, does
legal work for the hospital. Neither of us and none of the members of our imme-
diate families have a financial interest in the biotechnology company. We have
been affiliated with Harvard University for many years and are currently members
of its faculty. We received no compensation from the hospital or the biotechnol-
ogy company for this report and have not received grants, contracts, consultan-
cies, or other benefits as a result of it.
 
out their missions and sanctions institutional pursuit of
such funding. Society may not view this as self-interest-
ed behavior and consequently may erroneously be more
tolerant of circumstances in which an institution’s fi-
nancial interests may compromise the integrity of its
missions than of similar situations involving individual
conflict of interest.
 
A F
 
RAMEWORK
 
 
 
FOR
 
 A
 
NALYZING
 
 I
 
NSTITUTIONAL
 
 
C
 
ONFLICTS
 
 
 
OF
 
 I
 
NTEREST
 
Institutional conflicts of interest must be evaluated
in the light of four factors: the relation between an in-
stitution’s primary missions and its financial interest,
the size of the financial interest, the degree of discre-
tion involved in achieving the primary missions, and
the seriousness of the harms that might result from the
institutional conflict of interest.
 
Conflict of Interest and Primary Missions
 
Health care institutions have three primary missions
that are pursued for the benefit of the public: patient
care, teaching, and biomedical research.
 
1-3,5,8,10-12,16-19,24
 
There can be conflicts among these missions when one
institution pursues them.
 
8,10-12,24-26
 
 It is well recognized,
for example, that clinical research can conflict with pa-
tient care. Our society has developed procedures, such
as reviews of clinical trials by institutional review
boards, to prevent or mediate these conflicts.
 
25,26
 
Health care institutions also have other goals and in-
terests, including raising funds to support their mis-
sions and gaining recognition for their accomplish-
ments. Institutional conflicts of interest are conflicts
between the primary missions of a health care institu-
tion and its other interests.
 
1,2,8,10-12,16-19
 
 Although secur-
ing financial resources is important, it is only a means
— albeit a very important one — to support and fur-
ther the institution’s missions. Consequently, the insti-
tution’s legitimate interest in obtaining funds to sup-
port its activities must be considered secondary to its
primary missions. Any conflict between secondary in-
terests and primary missions needs to be examined to
ensure that the primary missions neither are compro-
mised nor appear to be compromised.
 
1,2,8,10-12,16-19
 
The Size of the Financial Interest
 
In the case of individual conflicts of interest, the
amount of the financial interest is an important factor
in determining whether the conflict is prohibited. Fi-
nancial interests that are small are unlikely to have, or
to appear to have, an influence on decisions about pa-
tient care, teaching, or clinical research.
 
1,8,10-12
 
 A simi-
lar view should prevail with regard to institutional con-
flicts of interest.
 
1,19
 
 There is, however, no absolute
standard for what constitutes a de minimis (minimal)
financial interest. Factors that should be considered in
establishing a dollar figure for a de minimis interest in-
clude the value of the present and potential payments
to the institution, the nature of the events that trigger
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the payments, and the size of the institution’s research,
discretionary, and operating budgets.
 
Professional Discretion in Patient Care and Biomedical 
Research
 
Both patient care and biomedical research, the basic
elements of clinical trials, entail a high degree of pro-
fessional discretion — for example, in determining
whether a symptom is an adverse reaction and whether
an adverse reaction is severe enough to discontinue the
therapy and in establishing relevant end points for a
trial. We should try to minimize, if not eliminate, cir-
cumstances in which financial interests may influence
or even distort any of these judgments.
 
1-3,10-12,16-19
 
 It is
also inevitable that professional judgments will appear
to be affected by institutional conflicts of interest. Be-
cause any discretionary decision can be influenced by
many factors, it may be impossible for external observ-
ers to determine what factors influenced a particular
decision. Indeed, it may even be difficult for decision
makers to be certain about their own motives and what
factors influenced a particular decision. Thus, reason-
able people may wonder whether financial motives
have influenced decisions.
 
Potential Harm from Conflicts of Interest
 
Patient Care
 
In the process of obtaining informed consent from
patients for participation in a clinical trial, physicians
might fail to provide information of interest to the pa-
tients, such as the nature or magnitude of the institu-
tion’s financial interest in the results of the trial. If the
patients gave consent without this information, their
right to informed consent might be violated, and their
consent might be invalid.
 
25-28
 
 An institutional conflict of
interest could also influence the investigators to ignore
or minimize symptoms indicating adverse reactions,
which in turn might endanger the health of the patients
in the trial. Furthermore, the positive results of a clin-
ical trial in which adverse reactions were ignored or al-
tered could lead to the approval of a therapy with un-
reported adverse effects that could endanger the health
of patients throughout the United States.
 
Teaching
 
A student, postdoctoral fellow, or other trainee
might be encouraged to conduct research in which the
institution had a financial interest even if that research
was not the most beneficial to the person’s education
or career development. However, teaching is not likely
to be seriously threatened by institutional conflicts of
interest involving clinical research.
 
Biomedical Research
 
Investigators conducting a clinical trial of a com-
pound, process, or therapy in which the institution had
a financial interest could compromise the trial by using
a poor or biased study design or by introducing bias
into the data-collection methods, statistical analyses, or
reporting and interpretation of the data. In addition,
the conflict of interest could distort research priorities
by affecting the distribution of essential research-relat-
ed resources, including space and discretionary funds.
Subtle pressure might induce clinical staff to encour-
age patients to participate in a clinical trial in which
the institution had a financial interest, reducing enroll-
ment in other clinical trials with similar eligibility re-
quirements. Finally, the appointment or promotion of
faculty members associated with the clinical trial in
which the institution had a financial interest could
compromise the integrity of the appointment-and-pro-
motion process. Even though particular decisions, such
as those concerning space allocation or promotion,
might not actually be influenced by financial motives,
they might be perceived by other investigators in the
institution as reflecting a bias in favor of the clinical tri-
al in which the institution had a financial interest,
thereby undermining morale.
Institutional conflicts of interest also threaten the
overall biomedical-research enterprise in the United
States. If the public becomes aware that a substantial
proportion of clinical research is performed in institu-
tions with conflicts of interest, its confidence in and
support of biomedical research may be eroded. Al-
though a financial conflict of interest on the part of one
health care institution will not alter the public’s percep-
tion of the integrity of biomedical research in general,
there is a cumulative effect. Moreover, the nation’s
leading health care institutions have a critical role in
defining the norms for appropriate practices. Public
confidence is most likely to be maintained if it is the ex-
ception rather than the rule for health care institutions
to have financial interests in the clinical research con-
ducted under their auspices.
These are not just potential threats. The primary
missions of health care institutions have been compro-
mised by individual investigators with conflicts of inter-
est.
 
3,13,29
 
 The most notorious example may be the Tseng
case, in which an ophthalmologist at Massachusetts
Eye and Ear Infirmary conducted a study of an oint-
ment for the treatment of “dry eyes” while he owned
530,000 shares in the company that would have mar-
keted the medication if the trial had been successful.
There were many irregularities in the clinical trial, as
well as manipulation of the release of data.
 
30
 
P
 
RIMA
 
 F
 
ACIE
 
 C
 
LAIM
 
 
 
TO
 
 A
 
VOID
 
 I
 
NSTITUTIONAL
 
 
C
 
ONFLICT
 
 
 
OF
 
 I
 
NTEREST
 
In the light of these considerations — the impor-
tance of preserving the integrity of the primary mis-
sions of health care institutions, the role of discretion-
ary judgments in clinical trials, and the potential
harms from conflicts of interest — there arises a prima
facie claim that such a conflict should be avoided and
that a clinical trial should not be conducted in an insti-
tution that has a financial interest in the outcome un-
less that interest is de minimis.
Some might argue that these ethical problems could
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be overcome by prohibiting commercial links between
health care institutions and companies. This position
ignores three points: federal encouragement of health
care institutions to commercialize their discoveries,
 
20-22
 
the lack of alternative avenues for developing biomedi-
cal advances into safe and effective products,
 
20
 
 and
the increasing financial pressures on health care insti-
tutions. Prohibiting commercial links between health
care institutions and companies would require substan-
tial changes in federal law and the economic system
for supporting the development of biomedical prod-
ucts. The possibility of such extensive changes seems
remote.
Others might argue for an absolute prohibition on
conducting clinical research at institutions with a finan-
cial interest in a product under study. Just as no rights
are absolute, no prohibitions should be absolute. The
ultimate objective of health care institutions is to ad-
vance the primary missions of patient care, teaching,
and biomedical research for the public good. The pur-
pose of regulating institutional conflicts of interest is to
protect the integrity of these missions. However, in the
unusual circumstance that a primary mission could
best be realized at an institution with a conflict of in-
terest, the prohibition imposed by the prima facie claim
could actually have the paradoxical effect of preventing
the realization of the mission. In this case, the public
interest would be better served if the prima facie claim
were overcome. For example, an institution with a con-
flict of interest might be the only appropriate site for a
clinical trial because of particular facilities or expertise
that could not be found elsewhere. But even if the pri-
ma facie claim were overcome, the threat posed by the
financial interest would remain and therefore necessi-
tate appropriate safeguards.
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Disclosure
 
Any patient considering whether to participate in a
clinical trial should be told about the conflict of inter-
est, and the conflict must be stated on the informed-
consent form. In addition, the institutional conflict of
interest should be disclosed to others, including the in-
stitutional review board, collaborators and coinvestiga-
tors at other institutions, other funders that have sup-
ported the clinical research, readers of articles and
abstracts that report the research results, and audi-
ences at oral presentations of the research results. Oth-
er safeguards adopted by the institution should also be
disclosed to the patient.
In theory, disclosure to the patient might be unnec-
essary if the people involved in the care of the patient
or the research were unaware of the institution’s finan-
cial interest. Because it is both highly unlikely that
these people would not know of the licensing arrange-
ment and impossible to document who knows about the
financial interest during the research, disclosure should
be required in all cases. We recognize that disclosure
of institutional conflicts of interest is not standard
practice in informed-consent procedures and may be
controversial,
 
27,28
 
 but it is consistent with the ruling in
one well-publicized case.
 
31,32
 
 Moreover, disclosure of
commercial relations is necessary for scientists to eval-
uate critically the merit of biomedical research.
 
33
 
 Simi-
larly, for patients to decide whether participation in a
trial is in their interests, they must be able to evaluate
the information they are provided, which necessitates
the disclosure of institutional conflicts of interest.
Although disclosure has been the safeguard recom-
mended most frequently, it is necessary but insufficient
for several reasons.
 
1,10-12,14
 
 First, disclosure “only re-
veals a problem, without providing any guidance for re-
solving it.”1 Second, those who receive the information,
especially patients, may not know how to evaluate it; in
fact, the disclosure may only increase their anxiety dur-
ing an already stressful period. Finally, health care in-
stitutions lack monitoring systems that can act on the
basis of a disclosure of a conflict of interest. Univer-
sities, medical schools, and hospitals have begun to
establish committees to monitor individual conflicts
of interest,3,11,12 but there have been few efforts to es-
tablish similar committees for institutional conflicts of
interest.19 Institutional review boards, collaborators,
funding agencies, and journal readers are not organ-
ized to monitor or respond to disclosures of conflict of
interest.
Internal Monitoring
Because internal reviews of patient care and re-
search have been used to monitor individual conflicts of
interest, a similar approach might seem appropriate for
institutional conflicts of interest. Internal monitoring
could be performed when an institutional review board,
ad hoc committee, or chief of service reviewed the pa-
tient care and research data and analysis associated
with a clinical trial. 
Such an internal review seems insufficient. Because
of their responsibility for the financial condition of the
institution, officials may not be disinterested in their
judgment. Furthermore, money is fungible; every ad-
ministrator, chief of service, and investigator could
therefore benefit from the institution’s proceeds from a
commercial license, even if they or their departments
did not receive the funds directly. To maintain public
confidence, monitoring must operate independently of
those who have responsibility for the institution’s finan-
cial condition or who, in their professional roles, could
benefit from increased revenues.
The institutional review board, which does not have
primary responsibility for the financial condition of the
hospital, has members from outside the institution, and
has a mandate to review research protocols, might ap-
pear to be more independent. Yet, some members of
the board might work for the department that stood to
benefit financially from the clinical research, and oth-
ers might benefit indirectly from the institution’s royal-
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ties. Finally, the public perceives these boards as inter-
nal rather than external bodies. Just as citizens may be
suspicious of the thoroughness of a government agen-
cy’s review of its own behavior, there may be little con-
fidence in an institutional review board’s judgment
when the institution has a financial interest in the re-
search.
External Monitoring
External monitoring offers a final safeguard against
the potential harm due to an institutional conflict of in-
terest. If a trial is to be conducted at several centers,
and none of the other institutions have a conflict of in-
terest, then these institutions could provide a monitor-
ing function that would be internal with respect to the
trial but external to the institution with the financial in-
terest. In one of the studies conducted by John Darsee,
the multi-institutional aspect of the study resulted in
the discovery of a fabrication of research results.34,35
However, the very possibility of a multicenter trial
means that there are institutions qualified to perform
the clinical research other than the institution with a fi-
nancial interest, which in turn means that there is no
compelling reason to overcome the prima facie claim
and have the trial conducted at the institution with the
conflict of interest.1,10-12
Alternatively, a committee composed of people out-
side the institution could be formed to review the re-
search design before the commencement of the trial
and regularly review all data related to the research.
This external committee should have the authority to
require modifications of the research or even stop the
trial. The chair and members of the committee should
be sufficiently removed from the institution so as not to
be subtly influenced by the interests of the institution
or its members and yet sufficiently knowledgeable to
review the research intelligently. To ensure that the
committee members do not themselves have a conflict
of interest, they should not hold stock in any company
connected with the clinical trial and should receive
no compensation for their monitoring activities (other
than reimbursement for expenses). The membership of
such a committee might include a biomedical research-
er and an ethicist or lawyer, and the committee should
have access to a statistician. Such an external monitor-
ing committee, whose purpose would be analogous to
that of peer review of articles submitted for publication
and grant applications, would seem to provide the best
safeguard.
External monitoring, however, has its own costs. For
the committee members, the work would be time-
consuming and professionally uncompensated, and it
might put them in the awkward position of criticizing
colleagues. For the investigators at the institution itself,
the external review could be quite time-consuming.
The monitoring process might also create an adversar-
ial relationship between the external reviewers and the
institution’s investigators. Nevertheless, in those few
cases where the prima facie claim is overcome and a
clinical trial proceeds despite an institutional conflict
of interest, monitoring by an external committee would
seem to provide the best safeguard.
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE
OF THE HARVARD-AFFILIATED HOSPITAL
The Harvard-affiliated hospital involved in this case
has a substantial financial interest in the outcome of
the clinical research, creating a prima facie claim that
it should not conduct either of the clinical trials of the
drug. In the trial involving the rare disease, however,
researchers at the hospital claim that it may be the
most appropriate site for the trial and perhaps the only
institution capable of conducting the research. We are
neither experts on this particular disease nor knowl-
edgeable about all the special skills and facilities re-
quired to conduct such a phase 1–2 trial. However, a
literature search seems to corroborate the researchers’
claim. In the past 10 years, 19 original articles have
been published on this disease, including 15 case re-
ports and 4 reports on treatment. The hospital’s re-
search is the most recent, involves the largest number
of patients, and constitutes the only therapeutic inves-
tigation of this disease conducted by a U.S. institution.
Also, fewer than 50 cases of the disease have been re-
ported, and the hospital may be one of the few referral
centers that follows a sufficient number of patients to
conduct a therapeutic trial. If the hospital does not
conduct the trial, the public may be deprived of an ef-
fective treatment for this rare, fatal disease. To ensure
that the public’s interest in continued research on the
disease is served, the hospital should probably perform
the study, with appropriate safeguards.
Conversely, the prima facie claim should not be over-
come for the multicenter trial involving a more com-
mon medical disorder. Hospitals other than the Har-
vard-affiliated hospital are well qualified to conduct the
trial, and the number of patients that this hospital
would contribute to the trial would be comparatively
small. Although the multicenter nature of this trial
does provide a safeguard against some of the threats
posed by the institutional conflict of interest, it does not
provide complete protection. The presence of safe-
guards does not mean that the public interest is better
served by conducting the trial at the hospital that has
a financial interest in the outcome.1,9,11
ADDITIONAL REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Institutional conflicts of interest clearly exist. Public
policies supporting technology transfer and the grow-
ing financial needs of health care institutions make it
likely that these conflicts will become more frequent.20
Yet we have no valid data on the dimensions of the
problem or institutional responses to it. The paucity of
data suggests the need for a study to document the fre-
quency of institutional conflicts of interest and the ex-
istence and efficacy of institutional policies regulating
them. If there are problems that institutions are not ad-
dressing properly, federal guidelines on institutional
conflicts of interest might be appropriate. Such con-
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flicts arise almost exclusively in the development and
clinical testing of compounds, processes, or therapies
that require the approval of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). Thus, an effective approach might
be for the FDA to designate any data from clinical tri-
als conducted at institutions with conflicts of interest as
inadmissible evidence for the approval of a drug or de-
vice, unless there was sufficient reason to overcome the
prima facie claim and appropriate safeguards had been
implemented. Such a policy would result in uniform
rules and interpretation of exceptions to those rules,
with rigorous enforcement by a regulatory authority.
We recognize that this proposal would require more
stringent regulation of institutional conflicts of interest
than the recently proposed FDA regulations for indi-
vidual conflicts of interest.36 The stricter regulation is
necessary because of the essential differences between
institutional and individual conflicts. Before such feder-
al guidelines were implemented, it would be important
to evaluate their benefits as well as the burdens they
would impose on health care institutions.
We are indebted to Dennis Thompson, Ph.D., Gregory C. Keating,
J.D., Ph.D., Alan Weisbard, J.D., and David Blumenthal, M.D., M.P.P.,
for their comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.
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